Industrial premises account for more workplace fires than any other building type in the UK. In 2024–25, industrial buildings were involved in 1,656 workplace fires — nearly a quarter of all workplace fire incidents recorded. Yet industrial fire safety remains one of the most inconsistently managed areas of fire risk, particularly in older manufacturing sites, warehouses and processing facilities where the combination of flammable processes, hazardous materials and ageing building fabric creates exactly the conditions that turned a routine Friday afternoon in Daejeon into a catastrophe.

The Anjeon Industrial fire has been widely covered as a South Korean story. But the factors investigators have identified are not culturally or geographically specific. They are the same issues that appear in UK fire risk assessments every week — and the same issues that the Fire and Rescue Service finds when it audits industrial premises that have been allowed to drift out of compliance.

What Happened in Daejeon

The fire broke out at 1:17pm on Friday 20 March 2026 at the Anjeon Industrial plant in Daejeon's Daedeok district — a three-floor auto parts manufacturing facility with 170 workers inside. It took more than ten hours and over 500 firefighters, police and emergency personnel to bring the fire under control. Fourteen workers died. Most of the bodies were found in a third-floor space used as a gym and locker room — workers who had no viable means of escape once the fire took hold below them.

Early investigation findings, as reported by the Seoul Economic Daily citing the National Fire Agency and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, point to several compounding failures. None of them were unforeseeable. The Daejeon Daedeok Fire Station had notified the factory of violations approximately one month before the fire broke out. The warnings existed. They were not acted upon.

Watch: The Daejeon Factory Fire, 20 March 2026

Footage of the Anjeon Industrial plant fire in Daejeon, South Korea, 20 March 2026. 14 workers died and nearly 60 were injured. The fire burned for over ten hours despite a major emergency response. Note: the official cause investigation is ongoing. The factors described in this article reflect early investigative findings as reported by the South Korean National Fire Agency and Ministry of the Interior and Safety.

The Factors That Made It Catastrophic

This was not a fire that was impossible to prevent, or that could not have been survived with better preparation. It was made catastrophic by a series of identifiable, addressable failures — each of which has a direct UK equivalent.

Accumulated flammable material

Cutting oil residue on ceilings and pipework acted as fuel throughout the building The factory used cutting oil in its manufacturing process. Residual grease and debris had accumulated on ceilings and pipes over time, creating an unbroken fuel load that allowed flames starting on the first floor to travel rapidly to the second and third floors. This is not unusual in manufacturing environments — it is the predictable result of inadequate housekeeping over time. In UK terms, this falls squarely within the responsible person's duty to manage fire hazards, and accumulated flammable contamination in process areas is one of the most common findings in industrial fire risk assessments.

Reactive hazardous substances

200kg of sodium on site reacted violently with water, preventing standard suppression The presence of sodium metal — used as a coolant in metal smelting — made conventional firefighting impossible in the early stages. Sodium reacts violently with water, limiting suppression options and delaying the relocation of the material to safety. The plant reportedly had no sprinkler system installed for the same reason. In UK industrial premises, the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR) require that hazardous substances are properly assessed, stored and managed — and that fire risk assessments account specifically for how their presence changes the fire risk and the suppression approach. Where hazardous substances preclude standard suppression, alternative strategies must be in place.

Sandwich panel construction

Highly flammable styrofoam insulation in the building's panels contributed to rapid spread and structural collapse risk The plant used "sandwich panel" construction with a polystyrene foam core — a building material widely used in industrial and food processing buildings across the UK for its thermal properties and low cost. When the foam core ignites, it acts as kindling, burning intensely and releasing dense toxic smoke. Fire can spread within the panels themselves, concealed from detection. Panels can delaminate suddenly, exposing the burning core directly and increasing structural collapse risk. Sprinkler systems and gas extinguishing systems are largely unable to control a fire involving the combustible core of sandwich panels. In the UK, EPIC (Engineered Panels in Construction) and insurers such as RSA and AIG have published extensive guidance on this risk — guidance that many industrial occupiers have not acted on.

Blocked escape routes

Illegal extensions to the building obstructed evacuation routes Unauthorised additions to the building had blocked means of escape. Workers on the third floor had no viable route out once the fire took hold below. In the UK, blocked or compromised escape routes are the single most commonly cited breach in FRS fire safety audits — Article 14 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 recorded 10,323 breaches in 2024–25 alone. See our post on fire escape and evacuation plans for what should be in place.

Prior warnings ignored

The fire station had issued a violation notice one month before the fire This is perhaps the most important detail of all. The hazards were not unknown. Enforcement authorities had identified violations and notified the factory. That notification was not acted upon. In the UK, failure to comply with a Fire Safety Matters letter or enforcement notice is a criminal offence — and the consequences of non-compliance are not administrative. They are measured in lives.

The UK Picture: Industrial Premises Are the Highest Risk Category

Industrial buildings account for approximately 24% of all workplace fires in the UK — more than any other premises type. Factories, warehouses, vehicle repair workshops, storage facilities and manufacturing plants consistently appear at the top of fire incident data, and for understandable reasons: they combine high fire loads, process-related ignition sources, complex electrical systems, flammable and sometimes reactive substances, and building fabric that in many cases predates current fire safety standards.

The factors that made Daejeon catastrophic — flammable process contamination, reactive hazardous substances, combustible construction, blocked escapes, and unheeded warnings — are not exceptional. They are the risk profile of a significant number of UK industrial sites that have never been properly assessed or have allowed their compliance to lapse.

For warehouse and industrial premises in Chester, the North West and North Wales, the questions the Daejeon fire raises are not abstract. They are operational.

Sandwich Panels: A UK Risk That Is Not Being Taken Seriously Enough

Sandwich panels — composite insulated panels with foam cores — are found throughout the UK's industrial building stock. They are used extensively in cold storage, food processing, warehousing and manufacturing for their thermal properties and ease of installation. Older buildings with polyurethane (PU) or expanded polystyrene (EPS) cores are particularly prevalent in the North West's industrial estates.

The fire risk associated with these panels is severe and well documented. When the foam core is exposed to fire, it ignites rapidly and burns with intense heat, releasing dense toxic smoke containing oily, sooty particulates. Fire spreads within the panel cavity itself — concealed from both detection systems and firefighters. Panels can delaminate suddenly, exposing the burning core directly and dramatically accelerating fire development. As RSA's Risk Control Guide notes, fires in buildings containing combustible sandwich panels often result in total loss — and water, sprinklers and gas extinguishing systems cannot control a fire once it enters the panel core.

If your industrial premises contain sandwich panels with combustible cores, this must be explicitly addressed in your fire risk assessment. Key questions include: what type of core material is present? Are the panels damaged or have any penetrations been made that expose the core? Are electrical systems and heat-generating equipment kept away from the panels? Is there compartmentation to limit fire spread? And critically — do your firefighting and detection arrangements reflect the specific fire behaviour of these panels, rather than those of a conventional building?

Hazardous Substances and the Limits of Standard Suppression

The sodium at Anjeon Industrial was not an unusual substance for that type of facility. It was a routine part of the manufacturing process. What made it dangerous was the combination of its presence with a fire that could not be controlled by conventional means — and the absence of any alternative suppression strategy.

In the UK, DSEAR requires that where dangerous substances are present on premises, the responsible person must assess the risks arising from those substances, implement appropriate controls, and ensure that emergency procedures account for the specific hazards they present. For premises where reactive substances preclude the use of water-based suppression, that assessment must address what alternative measures are in place — and those measures must be real, tested and understood by everyone on site.

This is not just a regulatory obligation. It is the difference between a fire that can be managed and one that cannot.

What UK Industrial Responsible Persons Should Do Now

Housekeeping

Treat flammable contamination as a fire hazard, not a maintenance issue Accumulated grease, oil residue, dust and combustible debris in process areas are fire hazards, not housekeeping oversights. They should be identified in your fire risk assessment as ignition sources and fuel loads, managed through documented cleaning schedules, and treated with the same seriousness as any other identified hazard.

Building fabric

Identify what your building is made of and what that means for fire If your premises contain sandwich panels with combustible cores, ensure your fire risk assessment explicitly addresses this. Check for damage, exposed foam cores and penetrations. Review whether your detection and suppression arrangements are appropriate for the specific fire behaviour of these panels.

Hazardous substances

Ensure your FRA addresses the specific risks of every substance on site Your fire risk assessment must account for every hazardous substance on site — not just as a storage or COSHH issue, but as a factor that may fundamentally change how a fire behaves and how it can be fought. If standard suppression is limited or contraindicated by substances on site, alternative strategies must be documented and in place.

Escape routes

Keep escape routes clear — and review the impact of any works or changes Blocked, compromised or inadequate escape routes kill people. This is the most consistently cited breach in UK fire safety audits. Any change to your building — new plant, additional storage, works, partitions — must be assessed for its impact on means of escape. Our post on fire safety during refurbishments covers how quickly this can go wrong.

Enforcement notices

Act on enforcement notices and informal warnings immediately The fire station warned Anjeon Industrial of violations a month before the fire. Those warnings were not acted upon. In the UK, failure to comply with a Fire Safety Matters letter or enforcement notice is a criminal offence. More importantly, it is a signal that your building has a known, identified risk that is being left unmanaged. If you have received any enforcement communication from your Fire and Rescue Service, it requires immediate action — not a note to agenda.

The Swiss Cheese Problem

No single factor made the Daejeon fire fatal. It was the combination — accumulated fuel load, reactive substances, combustible structure, blocked escapes, unacted warnings — that made it unsurvivable for those caught on the upper floors. Remove any one of those factors and the outcome might have been very different. As we explored in our post on Swiss Cheese Theory and fire safety, this is how catastrophic fires happen — not through a single dramatic failure, but through the alignment of multiple smaller ones that were individually addressable.

A robust, current fire risk assessment is what identifies those holes before they align. It does not prevent every possible incident. But it makes the catastrophic outcome significantly less likely — and it demonstrates that the responsible person has understood the risk and taken proportionate steps to manage it.

We carry out fire risk assessments for warehouses, industrial sites and commercial premises across Chester, the North West and North Wales. If your site has not had a proper assessment recently — or if you have concerns about any of the issues raised in this article — get in touch.

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We carry out thorough, professionally qualified fire risk assessments for industrial premises across Chester, the North West and North Wales — covering process hazards, building fabric, suppression limitations and escape routes.

Disclaimer: This article is intended as general guidance only and does not constitute formal fire safety advice for any specific premises or situation. The Daejeon factory fire is described based on early investigative findings as reported by the Seoul Economic Daily, citing the South Korean National Fire Agency and Ministry of the Interior and Safety, as of 22 March 2026. The official cause investigation is ongoing and findings may be revised. UK statistics cited are drawn from publicly available Home Office and MHCLG datasets. Responsible persons should seek professional fire safety advice tailored to their specific premises and circumstances. Fletcher Risk Management accepts no liability for actions taken or not taken on the basis of this article alone. Fletcher Risk Management is based in Chester and provides fire risk assessments, fire door inspections and fire safety training across the North West and North Wales. © Fletcher Risk Management Ltd, April 2026.